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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

34-35 ,7.1.

Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim - Investigations
Adjudicative proceedings - Settlement - Reconsideration
Determination.

(3)

(5)

(a)

Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative
proceeding, the commission shall promptly assign an
investigator to attempt a settlement between the parties by
conference, conciliation, or persuasion.

(b)

If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a
prompt impartial investigation of all allegations made in the
request for agency action.

(c)

The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall
conduct every investigation in fairness to all parties and
agencies involved, and may not attempt a settlement
between the parties if it is clear that no discriminatory or
prohibited employment practice has occurred.

(d)

If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for
agency action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a
final order.

(a)

If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the
investigator uncovers sufficient evidence during this
investigation to support the allegations of a discriminatory
or prohibited employment practice set out in the request for
agency action, the investigator shall formally report these
findings to the director.

(b)

Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may
issue a determination and order based on the investigator's
report.
1

(15)

(c)

A party may file a written request to the director for an
evidentiary hearing to review de novo the director's
determination and order within 30 days of the date of the
determination and order.

(d)

If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the
determination and order issued by the director requiring the
respondent to cease any discriminatory or prohibited
employment practice and to provide relief to the aggrieved
party becomes the final order of the commission.

The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy
under state law for employment discrimination based upon race,
color, sex, retaliation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related
conditions, age, religion, national origin, or handicap.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS-SUPPLEMENTAL
Appellee supplements the Statement of Facts in its opening Brief of
Appellee by including the following additional Statement of Facts:
1.

Paragraph 1.3 of the Professional Agreement Between the Board

of Education of Davis County School District and the Davis Education Association 199293 provides:
L3

No change, recision, alteration or modification of
this Agreement in whole or in part shall be valid
unless the same is ratified by the Board and the
Association and is endorsed in writing by both
parties. [R-10].

2.

Paragraph 1.4 of the Professional Agreement provides:

1.4

This Agreement shall be deemed to be a part of
each individual teacher's contract by reference
thereof. [R-10].

3.

Paragraph 2.1 of the Professional Agreement provides in part:

2.1

The Board of Education recognizes the Davis
Education Association as the exclusive
representative of the professional personnel except
as herein provided. [R-10].

4.

Paragraph 2.3 of the Professional Agreement provides:

2.3

The Board shall continue to recognize the
Association as the exclusive representative for the
term of this Agreement or any renewal thereof as
long as there is verification of representation, [R10-11].

5.

Paragraph 2.5.1 of the Professional Agreement provides:
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2.5.1 The rights and privileges of the teachers'
organization and its representatives as set forth in
this article shall be granted only to the Association
as the exclusive representative and bargaining agent
of teachers. [R-ll].
6,

By letter dated September 19,1992 addressed to the School District

Superintendent, Plaintiff expressed concern over the health care provision which he
claimed was discriminatory against married couples working for the School District.
[Findings of Fact, No. 26; R-261].
7.

On November 10, 1992, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with the Utah

Anti-Discrimination Division (UADD) claiming that the health insurance benefit plan of
the School District was discriminatory based on marital status, sex, and gender by
association. [Findings of Fact, No. 27; R-261].
8,

On March 24, 1993, UADD issued a Determination adverse to

Plaintiff. [Findings of Fact, No. 27; R-261].
9.

On April 28, 1993, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against the Davis

County School District in the District Court of Davis County, State of Utah in which it
was alleged, inter alia, that the School District violated the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act
on the basis of gender, gender by association and marital status. [Findings of Fact, Nos.
30, 31; R-261, 262].
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ADJUDGING
THAT THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE CONTAINED
IN ARTICLE V OF THE PROFESSIONAL
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DAVIS EDUCATION
ASSOCIATION AND THE DAVIS COUNTY SCHOOL
DISTRICT CONSTITUTES AN ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT SUBJECT TO THE ARBITRATION ACT.

Appellant's Reply Brief contains no new arguments and cites no new cases
on this Point.
The Respondent School District re-affirms its Argument that the Court
erred in finding that there was an arbitration agreement for the reason that there is no
evidence to suggest that the parties intended to have such agreement, the grievance
procedure provided for in the Professional Agreement is complete within its "four
corners" and is not unclear or ambiguous and that there is no manifestation of intention
of the parties to submit any dispute to final decision making authority of an arbitrator.
All these arguments are set forth in detail in the Respondent's opening Brief.
In addition to the arguments of the Appellee School District as set forth
in its opening Brief, the District relies upon a recent Utah case in further support of its
argument on this point. In Park City Education Association v. Board of Education, 244
Utah Adv. Rep. 39 (Utah App., 1994) this Court had before it a case interpreting a
Master Contract negotiated and agreed upon between the Park City Education Association
5

and the Board of Education of Park City School District following a process of collective
bargaining. In that process, the Park City Board of Education had recognized the Park
City Education Association as the "exclusive bargaining agent" for school teachers in the
District. Anticipating possible future conflict between the Master Contract and changing
Board policies, the parties provided that:
In case of any direct conflict between the express
provisions of this agreement and any Board of Education
Policy [,] practice, procedure, custom or writing not
incorporated in this agreement, this agreement [the Master
Contract] shall control.
244 Utah Adv. Rep. at p. 40.
The Master Contract originally applied to all teachers, including part-time
teachers, and all teachers received medical insurance coverage under the Master
Contract. Thereafter, the Board of Education changed its policy to provide that medical
insurance coverage would not be provided for teachers working less than twenty-five (25)
hours per week. Plaintiffs subsequently accepted twenty-hour employment contracts
under the terms of which they did not receive medical insurance coverage and thereafter
filed suit for coverage. The Trial Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of the
School District.

On Appeal, the issues were whether or not the Master Contract

prevailed over the subsequent individual contracts and whether or not the Plaintiffs could
bargain independently for their contracts and were, therefore, not covered under the
Master Contract.

6

This Court, in construing the Master Contract which was arrived at
through a process of collective bargaining stated:
Further, common sense dictates that the power to enter into
a contract includes the obligation to be bound by the
contract.
In footnote No. 5, the Court stated that:
Our conclusion is consistent with provisions of 1994
legislation establishing a Centennial Schools Program.
Utah Code Ann. §53A-la-301 to-304 (1994). This
voluntary program provides that the school directors of a
participating school may "request a waiver from the local
board of education of any provision in an agreement or
contract between the district and its employees that
prevents or hinders the school from achieving its
performance goals. * * * * * However, this waiver is
"subject to agreement between the local board and the
entity that represented 'the employees in obtaining the
agreement or contract referred to in Subsection (a). * * *
* * If a school board were free to unilaterally change
policies to obviate collective bargaining agreements, §53la-302(3)(b) would be superfluous.
The Court also observed in Park City:
The court noted [referring to a cited case] that it is wellestablished under federal labor law that "although any
employee can reach a separate agreement with the
employer, that separate contract must be consistent with the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by the union.
....Thus inconsistent separate agreements are not
enforceable [citing cases].
This Court also held in Park City that even separate agreements more
favorable to the employee than the collective bargaining agreement were unenforceable.
The Court cited cases holding that:
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"
the policy underlying these decisions is sound.
Nothing could undermine the authority of a collective
bargaining unit more thoroughly than allowing individuals
or cohorts of employees to enforce separate contracts that
were more advantageous to those employees than was the
collective bargaining agreement itself
Accordingly,
we decline to upset the balance by allowing individual
agreements to undercut the union as the bargaining agent.
244 Utah Adv. Rep. at p. 42.
In the present case, the Davis School District recognized the Davis
Education Association "as the exclusive representative of the professional personnel" for
the purpose of negotiating salary and benefits through a process of collective bargaining
[Professional Agreement, Exhibit A of Appendix to opening Brief of Appellant, §§2.1,
2.3, 2.5.1, and 3.1.4]. In addition, the Professional Agreement provides in §1.3 that no
change shall be made to the Agreement unless it is ratified by both the School District
and the Davis Education Association and that the Agreement is a part of each individual
teacher's contract, §1.4. The Appellant, Mr. Reed, was, in fact, a member of the Davis
Education Association when the Professional Agreement was negotiated. [Findings of
Fact, No. 24, R-261].
Appellant has sought to have the terms of the Professional Agreement
modified and changed. In effect, he has asked to change the Professional Agreement by
having the Davis School District provide a separate contract for him with respect to
medical coverage. This procedure would be contrary to the precepts enunciated in Park
City Education Association v. Board of Education, supra. If the Park City Board of
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Education in that case could not violate the terms of the Master Contract to the detriment
of individual teachers, it follows with equal force of logic ipso facto that Mr. Reed
cannot compel the Davis School District to violate and disregard the collectively
bargained terms of the Professional Agreement by creating special provisions for his
benefit. It also follows that even if Mr. Reed were entitled to arbitration, no arbitrator
would be empowered to disregard the terms of the Professional Agreement negotiated
between the Board of Education of Davis County School District and the Davis Education
Association through a process of collective bargaining. Therefore, it is nonsensical for
Mr. Reed to continue to insist upon the right to arbitrate when no arbitrator would have
the authority to violate the terms of the Professional Agreement and could not grant to
Mr. Reed the relief which he seeks.
The Judgment of the District Court should be reversed with respect to the
issue of arbitration.
POINT n
APPELLANT HAS PARTICIPATED IN PRIOR LEGAL
ACTIONS TO A POINT INCONSISTENT WITH
INTENT TO ARBITRATE, RESULTING IN PREJUDICE
TO THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AND AS A RESULT,
APPELLANT HAS WAIVED WHATEVER RIGHT, IF
ANY, HE MAY HAVE HAD TO ARBITRATION.
A.

APPELLANT'S ACTIONS ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
INTENT TO ARBITRATE.

For the reasons noted in Point I and the opening Brief, Appellant had no
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right to seek arbitration. Assuming arguendo that such right existed, Appellant has acted
in a manner totally inconsistent with any intent to arbitrate.

Appellant contends,

however, that "....Reed has acted in a manner consistent with his clear intent of not to
waive his right to arbitration". [Appellant's Reply Brief, p.5]. If Appellant wanted to
arbitrate, one is constrained to ask why then did he initiate an action with the Utah AntiDiscrimination Division and file an action in the District Court prior to the time he ever
attempted to file a grievance under the Professional Agreement? If the purpose of
arbitration is to avoid expense and ease court congestion as Appellant claims,
[Appellant's Reply Brief, p. 5], Appellant's actions certainly manifested an intent
contrary to those objectives.
In his Reply Brief, Appellant asserts that "

prior to taking any other

action, Mr. Reed attempted to invoke the arbitration procedures set forth in the
Professional Agreement by letter dated September 19, 1992". [Appellant's Reply Brief,
p.8]. The September 19, 1992 letter is set forth as Exhibit "B" in Appellant's opening
Brief and the characterization attributed to the letter by Appellant's Reply Brief is a
misrepresentation of what the letter actually says.

The letter makes absolutely no

reference to the Professional Agreement, it does not ask to invoke the grievance process,
and it says nothing about arbitration. The letter says that Reeds have no choice but to
take "further action" and concludes by stating: "Therefore, we have sent a grievance
letter to UEA [Utah Education Association] (a copy of which is attached) and a similar
letter to the State Anti-discrimination Division". [Emphasis added.]
10

The District Court found that Appellant was aware of the grievance
procedure set forth in Article V of the Professional Agreement [Findings of Fact No. 26;
R-261] and that the Appellant took his first step to invoke the grievance procedure
provided for in the Professional Agreement on May 28, 1993 [Findings of Fact No. 28;
R-262], which was some eight months after the September 19, 1993 letter.
In short, Appellant knew all about the grievance process provided for in
the Professional Agreement and instead of making any attempt to invoke it, filed an
action with the Utah Anti-discrimination Division and a Complaint in District Court
before he ever attempted to utilize the grievance procedure. In fact, in his September
19, 1993 letter he stated that he was filing a grievance with the Utah Education
Association.
B.

APPELLANT'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION WAS WITH THE UTAH ANTIDISCRIMINATION DIVISION.

Appellant has consistently claimed that the insurance program of the Davis
School District is unlawfully discriminatory based on "marital status, sex, and gender by
association". [Findings of Fact No. 27; R-261; Findings of Fact Nos. 30, 31; R-261,
262]. In fact, on April 28, 1993, Appellant filed a Complaint in the District Court of
Davis County in which such allegation was made.
Prior to that, on November 10, 1992 Appellant filed a Complaint with
UADD and received a "No Reasonable Cause" determination [R-55, 261] and did not ask
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for a reconsideration or request a hearing with respect to that decision by UADD. [R55, 56].
The Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act provides in §34-35-7.1(15) as follows:
(15)

The procedures contained in this section are the
exclusive remedy under state law for employment
discrimination based upon race, color, sex,
retaliation, pregnancy, child birth, or pregnancyrelated conditions, age, religion, national origin, or
handicap.

Appellant invoked the jurisdiction of UADD on what he felt was a
discrimination claim. UADD ruled against him. He did not ask for or seek any appeal
or further consideration by UADD. Under the provisions of §34-35-7. l(3)(d) and §3435-7.1(5)(d), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, the UADD decision must be considered as a
"final order" and inasmuch as the Utah Anti-Discriminatory Act provides that the
procedure contained therein is the exclusive remedy available to Appellant, he has no
right or standing to seek further review of the UADD decision rendered against him.
C.

APPELLANT'S REFUSAL TO ASK FOR A GRIEVANCE
INITIALLY HAS RESULTED IN PREJUDICE TO
RESPONDENT.

Appellant sought and received a final order from UADD. The School
District filed a lengthy Memorandum of Law opposing Appellant's claim which he had
initiated with UADD. After UADD issued an Order ruling against Appellant he then
filed a Complaint in the District Court seeking to litigate the same issue decided upon by
UADD. The Complaint was dismissed only after the School District filed a Motion to
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Motion. Simultaneously with filing his Complaint in the District Court the Appellant
filed a request under the Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA)
which required a response from the School District.
By Appellant's own admission, the purpose of an arbitration proceeding
is to save time and expense of litigation. It is disingenuous for Appellant to assert that
the School District has had to go through a UADD proceeding and file a Motion to
Dismiss and Memorandum of Law in connection with Appellant's District Court
Complaint without incurring any expense or prejudice. It is equally disingenuous for
Appellant to argue that the School District has not been prejudiced by responding to these
earlier actions because "no formal discovery" has been completed. Finally, Appellant
asserts that "no court ever has exercised discretionary power with regard to this case".
While no court has issued a decision, the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division did exercise
its discretionary authority and found that Appellant had "No Reasonable Cause". As
noted earlier, UADD is the exclusive remedy for the claim which Appellant has asserted.
In pursuing his argument, Appellant is basically asking this Court to
believe that the School District was able to respond to three different proceedings
initiated by Appellant without having incurred any expense or suffered any prejudice.
Obviously, the School District has been required to expend much time, effort and money
in responding to Appellant's claims. Appellant should not be allowed to put the School
District to this expense and then be allowed to file a grievance some eight months after
he first had the opportunity to do so.
13

CONCLUSION
The Professional Agreement contains Article V which describes a
"Grievance Procedure". There is no mention of the term "arbitrate" or "arbitration".
The Grievance Procedure cannot be considered an arbitration agreement because it lacks
the essential legal requirements to constitute an arbitration agreement. In an arbitration
agreement the parties agree that a matter will be submitted to an arbitrator and that the
arbitrator's decision will be final. The Article V Grievance Procedure provides in Step
3 that the grievance may be submitted to a hearing examiner. However, if the educator
is not satisfied with the decision of the hearing examiner, an appeal may be taken to the
Board of Education and thereafter either party may "appeal to an appropriate court of
law".

(Appendix to Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant, tab "A", page 51). The process

outlined in the Grievance Procedure is fundamentally different from and in conflict with
the concept of an arbitration agreement. The Judgment of the District Court on this point
should be overruled.
With respect to the issue of wavier, if this Court finds that the Grievance
Procedure does not constitute an arbitration agreement, the question of waiver becomes
moot. If this Court holds that the Grievance Procedure is an arbitration agreement, then
the Findings of Fact made by the District court should not be disturbed and this Court
should hold that Appellant's actions prior to requesting a grievance proceeding were
inconsistent with that process and that he had waived any right to pursue the matter by
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grievance or arbitration. The District Court's Judgment on that point should then be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of August, 1994.
KING & KING

FELSHAW KING, Esquirt
Attorneys for Appellee/Cross-Appellant
Davis County School District
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